Logistik

Som skrevet andet steds:

Well, there has been a lot of political to and fro about the ammunition shortage in Ukraine and contrasted it with the Russian aquisition of old fireworks from dictators:
1) Large ammunition depots are NOT to be placed where the enemy can get at them. The most protected place for ammunition is FAR beyound the front line. Ammunition is to be doled out to the units that actually need them at the latest possible moment. As seen with the russian tanks that carries an astonishing 60 rounds of ammunition. They won't use that - simply because once a russian tank is hit it will create a secondary explosion - even North Korean ammunition will explode if primed by a bomb. The trick is to load up the fire units with what is needed for their mission and let drones deal with the abandoned vehicles.
2) I would not worry to much about the procurement of lots of ammunition by the Russians. Those forward depots cannot be concealed, as there is a constant coming and going by trucks - as lined out in the report. Only lately is that being done with armoured vehicles. Trucks and vans are not protected which means they are vulnerable to even small explosive bombs/charges of small drones. The protected trucks do warrent artillery attention. But you rarely need a sledgehammer to swat a fly - the fly will be dead, but at what cost?
3) It is much smarter to lure the russians into traps in villages/hamlets where they are stuck. Their supply line is streached and ammunition transported through tunnels (and what have you?) is unlikely to be in substantial quantity. The other point is that remaining on the defensive in this war means that ukrainian to russian killed ratio is about 1 : 10 - with ukrainians being wounded, but not killed. It also creates an experienced ukrainian force that can absorb new recruits and get some rotation going.
4) The point is that the ukrainian army is learning the Nato supply discipline, which means that using a PULL strategy - i.e. you require ammunition and other supplies as you need it, not as you might want it. That means that on average you have what you need and can reasonably expect to use. This again means you don't have to transport a lot of ammunition to units that are not going to need it and thus make a lot of forward depots that are comfortably within drone range. The Russian PUSH strategy is moving as much as possible to the front, which in the best case scenario means that as the attacking units are massacred they obviously cannot use the supplies. This we have seen the places where the ukrainians have retaken territory. There is a lot of ammunition (and other supplies) to trophy.

Oprigtigt talt: Jeg aner det ikke.Måske absolut ingenting - måske afgørende? Jeg aner det IKKE.

Det jeg har noteret mig er, at mere end én blogger har anført at ammunitionsleverancerne til Ukraine er taget fra de ældste granater. Ikke at de ikke er i orden, det er de; men de nærmer sig sidste salgsdato med stormskridt. Det er granater, der under alle omstændigheder skulle enten destrueres eller rekonstitueres.
Disse indlæg kom EFTER, jeg havde gjort opmærksom på problemstillingen.

Nu er journalister og bloggere sjældent driftsøkonomer og har næppe selv en banal erfaring som administratorer af konserves i et supermarked. Der er ikke noget mystisk i det; men det er ikke alle, der har erfaring i lageradministration.

Det man normalt vil gøre er: Man piller stikprøver ud af de forskellige batches til øvelses og uddannelses skydninger (hvis man eller ved, hvad man foretager sig) for at kontrollere om fabrikationen holder tolerancerne - både i fabrikationen af dimsen og i "indmaden" - inden det bliver farligt at bruge lortet. Vi ser video'er af skydning af mortergranater, typisk af erobret (russisk) ammunition, hvor de må hælde granaten ud af røret (forsigtigt), hvilket er standard procedure, hvis skidtet nægter at lade sig affyre. De viser så også de granater, der planmæssigt begiver sig af sted: Ergo! Det er ikke morteren, der er noget i vejen med. Forklaring fra fabrikanten udbedes nu - og den skal være god.
Formentlig antager man i planlægningen, at man i Rusland holder de samme standarder i administrationen af depoter, som man (tilstræber) i Nato. FOR DET GØR RUSSERNE SGU IKKE!

Det næste er at Tyskland leverer 1000 155mm granater til Ukraine, hvilket fremkalder ironiske bemærkninger. Jeg ville gøre det samme som tyskerne. Simpelt hen fordi det er 20-30 år siden, at man sidst leverede ny fabrikeret ammunition fra den leverandør. Der er som sådan tale om delvist nyt personale, der skal opøves. Der skal anskaffes nye (evt. nyere brugte) værktøjer. Vi havde en maskine, som man ikke kunne lade lærlinge prøve, fordi den var så slidt (og i øvrigt lidet brugt), at man skulle have en erfaren faglært til at betjene den og hele tiden korrigere i indstillingen for slitagen.
Det man så gør er, at sende det første batch til Ukraine, så man kan afprøve under feltforhold, at de virker og er indenfor tolerancerne. De sidste er næppe et problem for tyskerne - de er ikke helt så hysteriske som schweizerne; men næsten. Schweizerne fabrikerer alt som om det var Rolex ure, hvorfor de opererer med afsindigt tætte tolerancer, der gør at de altid virker 110&; men koster det "hvide ud af øjnene".
Så lader man ukrainske enheder bruge dem i kamp for tilbagemeldingen om hvordan resultatet er - om om divergenserne evt. skyldes slidte rør el. lign.

Det sidste emne er, at man nu (fornuftigvis) går sammen flere små Nato-lande om afgivelse af samlede ordrer på standard som f.eks. artilleriammunition. Sagen er jo den, at fabrikanterne ikke investerer i tidssvarende produktionsteknologi, hvis de ikke har en helstøbt ordre. Det er også et forhold som er berørt EFTER jeg gjorde opmærksom på det elementære forhold.