Strategisk mobilitet

Som jeg så udmærket skrev:

Nej, jeg ser ikke nogen grund til at oversætte, dem, der er interesserede kan godt læse det engelsk, jeg kan.

Strategic/operational/tactical mobility is a question of the difficulty and speed of moving the force where you want it against the protection of the vehicles.
As to protection: Lets use the Nato Standard designations (STANAG) Level 1,2,3,4,5,6. The odd numbers are really the level corresponding to light, medium, heavy protection. The even numbers are a beefed up versions of the previous odd level indication that the enemy has had time to bring some of their nefarious plans into action.

Light forces can be airlifted into any airfield/-strip that can take a C-130 Hercules which is practical in so far, as the russian doctrine mentiones taking f.i. airfields first by the use of helicopters and parachutist - hence the designation of air assault. Such an airfield can be secured by local defence volunteers in a matter of hours and be preplanned each with a number of prepared positions. The light force has the advantage of choosing among a large number of possible airfields The light forces might not be able to move around after an attact has started, but given they are placed in positions that the enemy must pass (and their supply trucks) they don't have to be moved.
The light forces will be light on the transport requirement as well, because they use aircraft that does not NEED an airfield.
We saw an example of that in Ukraine. The russians wanted to take Hostomel airport and was butchered by local defence and the mere thought of bringing in troops with Candid could be rejected out of hand, as time was gained to bring somewhat serious firepower. Not only would the idiot be blown to smithereens, but ekspensive and irreplaceable aircraft would be lost.
The USA cannot be absolutely certain that they land on an uncontested airfield with their big, fat, lumbering irreplaceable Globemasters - they need more warning.
The case of Denmark is that we need only the time it takes the transport to fly to a Baltic country or Poland, Bulgaria or whatever. This is a scenario that has been practised. A air-policing mission was moved forward by three weeks when Helle Thorning-Schmidt was PM. As soon as the matter was decided in parliament the F-16 collected the undercarridge on their way. The spies in the Defence Forces and Parliament had not the remotest incling of what was going on and could as such not inform their superiors, that know about their disgusting habits with children or their strained financial situation.

Furthermore: The light forces can be kept supplied - their logistic footprint is smaller: Their rounds are lighter, their vehicles need less fuel and can be sourced locally - and the food can be supplied to the locals as well.

The medium forces are road transportable on their own wheels. In Denmarks case they will get ahead of the rush-hour and be on their merry way before our dear allied are found in beds that was NOT in the official list. Generally the roads in Europe goes along rivers which in case of Eastern Europe is north south. The bottleneck is the east -west as everybody scrambles to get where they are supposed to. North-South will be free (for the supply trucks as well) and an 8*8 can use secondary roads to good effect and cross old bridges that tanks can't 60 tons is over the top for the bridge over the old mill-race.

The heavy forces must be transported by sea. Which is not the largest problem in the world, as there are good ferry connections in the Baltic. The problem is the road between the port and (sherry - the place they are supposed to be.)